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Concepts  of private property  in land use can be found  in most
cultures. Even under Communist rule, where  as a matter of theory
property  in  land  has  been  eliminated,  departures  from  the  rule
are  not unheard  of.  Speaking  of property  in  general,  Charles  A.
Reich  wrote  in the  Yale Law Journal in  1964:
The institution called property guards the troubled boundary between
individual  man and  the  state.  It  is  not  the  only  guardian;  many  other
institutions,  laws,  and  practices  serve  as  well.  But  in  a  society  that
chiefly values  material well-being,  the power to control a particular por-
tion of that  well-being is  the very  foundation  of individuality.
Western  society  has  sought  the  origins  of property  concepts
in  many  places,  including  Biblical  teachings,  Greek  philosophy,
early  Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon folk law,  Roman law,  and feudal
relationships.  Some,  not primarily  concerned  about origins,  have
stressed  the "natural  law"  character  of property rights  as  simply
inherent  in  humanity.  And for the  more  pragmatic,  the  existence
of property rights  is  the starting point for analysis.
A variety  of property  concepts  can  indeed  be  found  in  many
cultures. The specific content of property rights involves important
values  and  beliefs.  To  what  extent  concepts,  values,  and  beliefs
have  moved  from  one  culture  to  another  may  be  important  only
to the extent that such historical analogies may provide rationaliza-
tions for particular practices and  policies.
I  have recently  spent three  months  in the Federal  Republic  of
Germany studying its system of land use planning and control, and
in this paper  I will contrast concepts  and practices  in that country
with those  in  the  United  States.  Hopefully,  this  comparative  ap-
proach may provide new insights into land use planning and control
problems.
THE U.S.  SITUATION
Property Values
The settlers of the original thirteen colonies  undoubtedly drew
on their English experience  in formulating American property con-
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plants  of English property  institutions.  Hence,  it  is useful to  con-
sider some of the special  circumstances  which contributed  to  the
development  of American  property  concepts  and  values.  Two  of
these  were  the  tremendous  quantity  of vacant  land  and  the  tre-
mendous  amount  of energy  and  effort  that  went  into  developing
a tract  of land  for  productive,  agricultural  use.  The  quantity  of
land made it of little value.  It was the labor that went into making
it  productive  that  was  significant.  And  after  that  labor  was
expended,  a  sense of ownership  would  seem  to have  been  inevi-
table.
When the colonists first landed at Plymouth,  land was assigned
to  the  respective  settlers,  and  the  harvested  crops  went  into  the
common  stores.  However,  no  ownership  of particular  plots  was
established.  Under  this  system,  apparently  production  was  low
and after only three  years  (in  1623)  a land  ownership  system was
instituted.  On  this new  system,  Governor  William  Bradford com-
mented  in Of Plymouth Plantation:
This  had very  good  success,  for it  made  all hands  very  industrious,
so  as  much  more  corn  was  planted  than  otherwise  would  have  been.
. . The  women  now went  willingly  into  the  field,  and  took their  little
ones  with  them  to  set  corn;  which  before  would  allege  weakness  and
inability;  whom  to  have  compelled  would  have  thought  great  tyranny
and  oppression.
The attitudes  of the early  settlers  and the contrast  with Euro-
pean views are illustrated in Travels in the Confederation, 1783-84
by J.  D. Schoepf, a German traveller who visited the United States
just after  the Revolution:
In America  ...  whoever holds new land,  in whatever way,  controls
it as his exclusive  possession, with everything on it, above it,  and under
it.  It  will  not  easily  come  about  therefore  that,  as  a  strict  statutory
matter, farmers  and landowners  will  be taught  how to manage their for-
ests  so  as  to  leave  for  their grandchildren  a  bit  of wood  over  which
to hang a tea kettle.  Experience  and necessity  must here  take the place
of magisterial  provision.
These factors  of quantity of land and frontier  self-reliance  and
individualism,  coupled  with  the  energy  expended  in winning  the
land,  might alone  have  resulted  in the development  of a  uniquely
American  philosophy  of land  rights,  but other factors  also  seem
to have  been  important.
Among  such  additional  factors  is  the  fact  that  many  of the
early  colonists  migrated  to  the New  World in protest of the arbi-
trary excesses  of the kings,  some of which were evidenced  in the
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of resistance,  then, the emphasis of John Locke on the importance
of property  undoubtedly  struck  a  responsive  note.  Locke's  com-
ments on property were essential to his views on civil government,
and he  supported  his attacks  on the Stuart  kings  by  stressing the
sanctity  of property  with  which the  kings  were  interfering.  Thus
he wrote  in Of Civil Government, Second Treatise:
The great  and  chief end,  therefore,  of men's uniting  into  common-
wealths,  and  putting  themselves  under government,  is the  preservation
of property.  . . . For the  preservation  of property  . . . [is]  the  end  of
government,  and that  for which  men enter into  society.
The founding fathers were probably familiar with Locke's argu-
ments,  but  there  is  no  way  of assessing  how  broadly  his  views
were  disseminated.  Certainly  the colonists  were  not  prepared  to
accept  feudal  concepts  of property,  particularly  those  concepts
which  emphasized  duty and  obligation.  Feudal  dues do not  seem
to  have  played  an  important  role  in  Colonial  development;  the
issue of "taxation without representation"  concerned  excise taxes
and not  land taxes or feudal  dues.
In a 1965 Iowva Law Review John E. Cribbet has quoted Francis
G.  Philbrick  as  saying that  "in the case of feudalism  it is  regret-
table  that  there  could  not have  been  preserved  the  idea  that  all
property  was  held  subject  to  the  performance  of duties-not  a
few  of them  public."  And  Professor Cribbet  has  added,  "It  may
be that the  wrong concepts  of feudalism  survived-that  we threw
out the baby and kept the bath."  But these issues,  to be considered
again  later  in  this  paper,  were  probably  not  in  the  minds  of the
colonists.  It  is  not  clear  that  any  extensive  body  of  theory
developed  to support the practice described  by the German visitor,
namely that of regarding  property as  solely and exclusively belong-
ing  to  him  who  lived  on  it  and  worked  it.  There  is  convincing
evidence  that  legal concepts  of property  law  as well  as  the  views
of the political  philosophers  were introduced  later.
Even  though  the  ideas  of the  political  philosophers  had  little
influence  on  the  average  settler,  they  were  important  to  the
development  of the ideas  of the  Revolutionary  leaders  and  after
the  Revolution  became  part of American  concepts  of land rights.
In the  view  of Adam  Smith,  property  was  an  individual  right  to
be protected,  not regulated  by the state. His emphasis,  as Locke's,
was  on  rights,  not  duties.  And  with  Jeremy  Bentham,  Locke
assumed  a  congruence  between  individual  and  social  interests.
Thus  when  the  individual  pursued  his  own interest,  he  promoted
the welfare  of all (society).
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Bentham,  relatively more  came  to  know  Sir William  Blackstone,
for many nineteenth  century American lawyers  relied extensively
on his Commentaries on the Laws of England to qualify for admis-
sion to the bar.  And it was  Blackstone  who declared:
There  is  nothing  which  so  generally  strikes  the  imagination  and
engages the affections  of mankind,  as the right  of property;  or that  sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the rights of any other individual
in the universe.
Even  Blackstone  recognized that the free use,  enjoyment,  and
disposal  of property  could  be  controlled and  diminished  "by the
laws of the land." John Locke emphasized that "nothing was made
by God for men to spoil or destroy."  But such qualifications  were
lost in the strong thrust for "sole and despotic  dominion."
Property and Liberty
The ideological  importance of property is  suggest by the refer-
ences  to  it  in  various American  Bills of Rights.  The  Virginia  Bill
of Rights  of  1776  stated  that  among  the  inherent  rights  of men
were the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring
and possessing property,  and pursuing  happiness  and safety.  And
the  Massachusetts  Bill  of Rights  of  1780  declared  that  all  men
have certain natural, essential, and unalienable  rights among which
may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their life and
liberty;  and of acquiring,  possessing,  and protecting property.
For reasons that have never been  satisfactorily explained,  Jef-
ferson  substituted  "pursuit  of happiness"  for  "property"  in the
customary  trilogy  "life,  liberty,  and property"  when drafting the
Declaration  of  Independence.  But  Jefferson  did  not  thereby
indicate  a  lessening  in  his  regard  for  the  important  relationship
between  property  and  liberty.  In  1774  he  dismissed  the  idea that
feudal  relationships  carried  over  into  the  colonies  and  was  one
of the leaders  in abolishing  primogeniture  in Virginia.  He  felt that
ownership  should  rest  on occupation  and  that  a  wide ownership
base  would  support  democratic  freedoms.  Thus he  proposed  the
distribution of Virginia lands to each settler,  an idea that ultimately
was incorporated  in the  Homestead  Act (1862) and for  somewhat
similar reasons.
Not all the  Revolutionary leaders  felt  so strongly  on the issue.
Thomas  Paine,  criticizing  the  "natural  law"  theory  of property,
commented  that  in  his  opinion  the  Creator  of the  earth  did  not
open  a  land  office  from  which  the  first  title  deeds  were  issued.
But  the dominant  view  was  one  which  cherished  property  rights
69as  indispensable  to  liberty.  Liberty  was  conceived  of as  being
against  government.  Thus  in  1792  when  the  Bill  of Rights  to  the
U.S.  Constitution  was adopted,  the  Fifth Amendment  was  aimed
at  the  national  government,  stating  "no  person  shall  ...  be  de-
prived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law;
nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for  public  use,  without just
compensation."  It  is  important  to  emphasize  this  "antigovern-
mental"  bias of the Fifth Amendment  when considering  the com-
plexities  in  defining  public rights  in  land.
To sum up this period of American  property concepts,  property
was regarded  as  a  positive  and necessary  factor in the  protection
and  development  of liberty,  and hostility  to  government  interfer-
ence  with  property  was  a positive  and  necessary  policy.  A  third
aspect  of property  rights  began  to  show  up as  settlement  moved
westward  and  it  became  necessary  to  draw  boundaries  between
what  was  thine  and  mine.  This  was  an  important  aspect  of the
Land Ordinance  of 1785  and of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
both  of  which  reflected  the  concept  that  governments  were
instituted  to  protect  property  rights.  Perhaps  the  most  dramatic
example  of these  attitudes,  uniquely  reflecting  the  problem  of
drawing boundaries  in  a frontier situation,  is the manner  in which
Western  mining  and water law developed.
As  a  result  of  the  Mexican  War  through  the  Treaty  of
Guadalupe  Hidalgo  of 1848,  the United States  acquired a tremen-
dous  quantity  of land,  but  Congress  was  slow  to  enact  statutes
governing  this  new  territory.  The  discovery  of gold  in California
in  the  same  year  of the  treaty,  brought  in  a  host  of Americans.
But  since  there  was  no  law  governing  the  situation,  mining  and
the use of water for mining and for irrigation  went forward without
any governing  law.  Pillage,  piracy,  theft,  and violence  might have
resulted.  Instead,  consistent  with the  "compact theory of govern-
ment"  developed  by  John  Locke,  the  miners  worked  out  an
arrangement whereby those making a discovery formed an associa-
tion,  agreed  on the claim  size  each  miner  was  entitled  to,  deter-
mined  the  amount  of work  that  must  be  done  each  year  on  the
claim,  and placed  in  a record book the regulations  of the associa-
tion  and  a  description  of each  claim.  Thus  the  miners  devised
an  arrangement  whereby  mineral  bearing  lands  in  the  public
domain could be acquired by  individuals  simply  by taking  posses-
sion.  Congress  and  territorial  and  state  legislatures  subsequently
approved the method of establishing private rights to mineral lands.
An  almost  identical  process  took  place  with respect  to  water
rights  in  the  semiarid  West  where  water  often  was  scarce.  Thus
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which  gave  the  first  user (miner  or irrigator)  the right  to  use  the
quantity  of water  he  had  initially  taken,  so  long  as  he  continued
to  use  it  constructively.  And  because  of variations  in  flow,  the
doctrine was  often  stated as  "first  in time,  first in  right."
Duty  or Obligation  and the  Public Interest
The way American  concepts of land rights developed has been
reviewed to  stress  the  emphasis on  individual  rights  and freedom
in  prevailing doctrines  and pragmatic practices.  By the end  of the
nineteenth  century  and  well  into  the  twentieth  sole  and absolute
dominion was a virtual reality.  The sanctity of property rights and
their  protection  from  government  interference  were  fundamental
to American  political and economic  thought.  The more firmly  the
doctrines  became  established,  the  more  the essential  relationship
of property  to  liberty  was  obscured.  No  longer  was  the  struggle
one  of resisting  royal  encroachments.  And  as  a  result,  the  idea
that property rights brought  with them responsibilities  and obliga-
tions toward the community was also largely forgotten. Once prop-
erty taxes  had  been paid,  most landowners  probably  felt  that  all
social obligations  had been  met. Even  when public  interests  were
involved,  the  orientation  was  toward  rights  and  not  obligations.
It was assumed that  individual rights and interests  were automati-
cally  congruent  with those of the community.
Only occasionally did overt dissent, such as the Populist Move-
ment and later the  Progressive Movement,  suggest that the public
interest  in land might  be different  from  the private  rights.  Henry
George's  attack was not primarily in terms of the social obligation
of  property,  but  rather  against  excessive  profits  and  unearned
increments,  which  were  to  be  limited  by  the  single  tax  system.
In  explanation  of the  mood  of the  times,  it  might  be  noted
that from about  1870 to 1920 the major effort of the national govern-
ment was  to dispose of the public  domain.  Over 700 million  acres
of public lands  were privatized  in that fifty-year  period,  with each
decade except  the first  seeing from  100 to 200  million  acres trans-
ferred to private or state ownership,  with almost 200 million  being
occupied under the Homestead  Act of 1862.  It is a popular miscon-
ception  that,  because  the  frontier  disappeared  by  1890,  disposal
of the  public  domain  also  ended  at  that  time.  In  fact,  more  of
the  public  domain  was  disposed  of and  more  homestead  entries
were  made  after  1890  than  before!  Thus,  with  the  disposal  to
private  ownership  of vast  acreages  of so-called  vacant  land,  it
could  have  been  understandably  difficult  to  articulate  a  specific
policy  which  stressed  the  social  obligations  of private  land  and
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a matter of fact,  this  same  time  period  saw the beginning  of both
the  National  Park system  and the National Forest  system,  which
even then involved  vast acreages.
Bentham,  Adam Smith,  and others  who struggled with the con-
cept  of  property  rights  recognized,  as  Bentham  wrote,  that
"Property  and  law  are  born  together,  and  die  together.  Before
laws were made there was  no property;  take away  laws and prop-
erty ceases."  Professor Cribbet  summarized  this  view  in  stating
that  ".  . . property  is  shaped  and  controlled  by  law  but  law  is
shaped  and  controlled  by  society.  Our  search  for changing  con-
cepts  in  the  law  of land  use  must  involve  an  understanding  of
the changing  nature of modern life, especially of those phases nor-
mally subsumed  under the  rubric,  'population  explosion.'
A search in the literature, judicial opinion, and elsewhere, gives
an impression that  is not  so simple  and  stark  as presented  above.
Scattered through  many judicial opinions,  for example,  are  state-
ments of the public  interest  in  private  land, or even  a recognition
of the  social  obligations  of the  private  landowner.  Much  of this
language,  however,  stems  from the  private  nuisance  concept  (so
use  your property  as not to injure your neighbor),  and this concept
was  narrowly  defined  compared  with  today's  concern  for  exter-
nalities  and spill-over effects.  Moreover,  in  many  of the  opinions
the  expressions concerning  the public interest  had minimal impact
on the way the law developed.  It is generally  agreed,  for example,
that the U.S.  Supreme  Court decision  sustaining  urban  zoning  in
1926 did so more on narrow nuisance grounds than on any concep-
tion  of a  public interest  in  how  land  should  be  used over  against
one's neighbors  and the  community.
THE GERMAN  SITUATION
The  Context of Land Use  Control and Planning
While  the  German  and  the  American  cultures  are  similar  in
many  ways,  there  are  a  number of significant  differences  which
set the  stage for German  land use planning  and control.
One of the first of these differences  is the population-land  ratio.
The  area of the German  Federal  Republic  is  somewhat  less  than
that  of Colorado.  Its  population  is  about  60  million,  about  three
times  that of New  York state  which  has  about half the area.  The
German population  is probably  distributed somewhat more gener-
ally  than  that of New  York,  since there  is  no  German  city  any-
where  near as  large  as New  York City.  However,  the area  north
from  Bonn  to  the  Ruhr,  including  the  Ruhr  Valley  and  west  to
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in the  Western,  industrialized world.  Unquestionably,  the density
of population  provides  a  stimulus  for  planning  and for  accepting
state intervention  in the form of planning. The widespread recogni-
tion in official and unofficial circles of the need for recreation facil-
ities  is  but  one  example  of how  population  densities  affect  land
use  planning  and  control.  Perhaps  because  land  use  is  managed
relatively well,  one is just not aware  of these densities.
Another set  of factors  which  are  a part of the background  for
German  land  use  control  is  historical.  Germany  has  not  been  a
vacant land comparable to the United States in 1800.  But Germany
was  until  the  end  of World  War  I  a  kingdom,  with  a  complex
structure  of royalty,  princes,  and  barons,  many  of whom  owned
or controlled  substantial areas  of land.  In contrast to  France,  for
example, Germany  did not experience  expropriation  of the nobil-
ity.  Although  it  is  easy  to  place  too  much  emphasis  on  this,  it
probably  can  be  said  that  in  Germany  the  effects  of the  feudal
era  are  still  quite  apparent,  perhaps  more  so  than  in  Britain.
Agricultural  lands appear to be farmed under a complex  structure
of agreements  and  relationships,  including  individual  ownership
as well  as a variety  of other tenure  forms.
A  number  of  other  historical  sociological  factors  should  be
noted.  One of these  is  that the government  is a federation.  While
this suited the  victorious  allies after World War II, it also reflects
the  historical relationships  of the various  principalities  that  were
first  brought  together  under  Bismarck's  leadership  in  1870.  One
result  is  that  a  major  role  in  land  use  control  is  played  by  the
state  governments.  Another  factor,  at  least in  many  parts of the
German Federal Republic,  is the aggregation of farmers in villages,
rather  than on  their farm  lands  as  in the  United  States.  Finally,
Germans  have  been  fond  of  the  outdoors  and  have  cherished
nature. Greenbelts  do not have to be "sold"  to the German public!
Some  might  attribute  the  acceptance  of land  use  controls  in
Germany  to  the  supposed  willingness  of  Germans  generally  to
submit to authority.  But it seems difficult to separate this sociologi-
cal factor from an acceptance  of planning decisions  for the simple
reason  that  without  such  acceptance  the  situation  would  soon
become  intolerable.  Germans  appear  to  be  less  litigious  than
Americans  and are less likely to challenge governmental  decisions.
Partly,  this  reflects  the  rather different  philosophy  of the  Roman
law  from the common  law  with respect  to the  role  and  authority
of  the  judge.  Substantial  reinforcement  for  the  acceptance  of
bureaucratic  planning decisions arose  from the need  to rebuild the
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shattered  society,  and the  shattered  government required  firm and
forceful  action.  And authoritative  action-oriented  planning  was a
necessity.
In  the United  States the  debate  over socialization  of land and
other means  of production  have  taken  place  more  often than not
in  academic  halls  rather than  at  the  barricades  or  in  constituent
assemblies.  In contrast,  in Europe generally,  and in Germany par-
ticularly,  the  tensions  among  differing  theories  and  perceptions
of property  were  part of day-to-day  political life  through most  of
the nineteenth century and even to today. The philosophies of clas-
sical liberalism  with  its stress on  private  property and  individual-
ism,  concepts  of state  capitalism,  beliefs  in democratic  socialism
and the values of social responsibility of the Christian community,
nationalization proposals of communism-these and many variants
were  in  day-to-day  conflict.  Each had  its  adherents;  each  looked
to the day when it might  shape governmental  and social institutions
in  accordance  with  its  world  view.  Nothing  comparable  ever
existed  in the  United  States.  One  result,  as  might  be  expected,
the  German  Constitution or Basic  Law  reflects  the compromises
that such varying philosophies,  theories,  and values would require,
so long as no  one group or coalition could sweep  away  all opposi-
tion and carry forward  its  plan  for a new  society.
The  Basic  Law
The  "Bill of Rights"  of the  Basic  Law  declares  in  Article  14,
Section  1, that  'private  property  and the  right of inheritance  are
guaranteed."  This  statement  is  simple  and clear-cut.  But the  sec-
tion continues  to state that the "content and limits on private prop-
erty are to be specified by statute."  This language places a substan-
tial  responsibility  on the German  Parliament.  In comparison  with
the  American  Constitution,  the  Basic  Law  does  not  suggest  or
imply  limits on the  ordinary  legislative  power.
Section  2 of  Article  14  further  complicates  the  clarity  of  the
mandate  by  declaring,  "The  duties  of  property.  Its  use  shall
redound to  the  common good or  general  welfare."  Thus  is  stated
the  social  obligation  of  property.  Rather  than  a  bulwark  of
individualism  to  be  protected  from  government  encroachment,
property and its uses  are regarded  in the context of societal needs.
This  emphasizes  the idea that property  and property rights  in fact
are products  of,  to  use  Locke's  phrase,  the  social  contract.
Section 3 of Article  14  indicates that expropriation  or condem-
nation  (what the  Fifth Amendment  of the  U.S.  Constitution calls
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good  or  general  welfare.  And  then it  states that expropriation  or
condemnation  can  occur  only  when  provided  for  by  a  specific
statute  which  specifies  the  means  and  measure  of compensation
or damages.  Thus far the provision  is  very similar to the  language
and  practice  under  the  U.S.  Constitution.  But  then  the  section
suggests  that  the  amount  of damages  is  to  be  determined  by  an
equitable  balancing  of the  interests  of the  community  and  those
of the  affected  party.
This  language  reminds  me  of the  Calvert  Cliffs  case  in  which
Judge Skelly Wright talked about the National Environmental  Pol-
icy Act requiring  a balancing of social gains against environmental
degradation.  Some  American  courts  have  talked  about balancing
with  respect  to  condemnation  or  taking,  but  their  concern  was
not with balancing  to determine  the value or amount of compensa-
tion,  but  rather  with  balancing  to  determine  whether  the  taking
was justified.
Finally,  Section  3 of Article  14  permits  appeal  to  the  regular
courts if there is a dispute over the  amount of compensation.  Ger-
man  courts  have  been  explicit  in  denying  "market  price"  or
"market  expectation"  as  the  measure  of value.  In  one  decision,
the  court explicitly  stated  that to  pay  market  price  was  contrary
to the Basic Law, one of the reasons for this view being that market
price  tends  to  include  the  value  added  by  the  public  or  societal
decision  to use  the  land.  The person affected  by  an expropriation
may  appeal  to  the  Administrative  Courts,  and  if the  issue  is  one
of constitutional  power  or  authority,  the  Constitutional  Court  is
available  to the aggrieved  party.
The  ideological  tensions  which  lay behind  the  Basic  Law  are
perhaps  best illustrated  in Article  15,  which  authorizes  the sociali-
zation of land, means of production,  and natural treasures.  It sets
up  the  procedural  requirement,  however,  that  socialization  must
be for the general  welfare  and  must be based  on a specific  statute
which  spells  out  the  means  and  measure  of compensation  as  a
part of the process of socialization.  Valuation is to follow the provi-
sions of Article  14,  Section  3.  If a  thoroughly  committed  socialist
party gained power, one wonders how the balancing process would
work  where  socialization  of land  or  of the  means  of production
were  involved.
There  are  other  provisions  in  the  Basic  Law  (the  guarantee
of the  full  and  free  development  of one's  personality;  the  right
to  life  and  to  remain  physically  undisturbed;  the  right  to  travel,
to  live where  one chooses,  and to follow  the occupation or calling
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ing and  limits of property  rights,  but they  will have  to  be  treated
elsewhere.
Several statutes have been enacted to implement the provisions
of the  Basic  Law  with  respect  to  planning  and  land  use  control.
As  is  typical  in  a  federal  state,  powers  are  shared  between  the
central  government  and  the  states.  In  addition,  by  tradition  and
under  the  Basic  Law,  substantial  power  and  authority  resides  in
the  communities  or local  governments.  Probably  the most  impor-
tant federal statute is a statute for "the ordering of space," enacted
in  1965.  In addition there  are  statutes dealing  with settlement  pol-
icy,  with  transportation  networks,  with  agricultural  land  use and
consolidation  of holdings,  with water, with  nature protection,  and
a number  of other  topics  that  have  significant  bearing  upon  land
use  planning.  But  in  most  respects  the  statute  for  the  ordering
of space is the  most comprehensive,  providing for the coordination
of most of the other planning  activities.
Each  of the  states  has  enacted  four  or  five  relevant  statutes
implemented  by  appropriate  administrative  policies  and  regula-
tions.  But  most  of the  actual  planning  is  carried  on  at  the  local
level-in  the  communities,  through  federations  of communities,
through counties, through administrative  regions, or through larger
regions,  the  oldest of which  is  the Ruhr  Region.  At the  state and
federal levels  major responsibility  is for coordination,  establishing
guidelines,  assuring  that  problems  which  transcend  local  bound-
aries are  taken into account,  and providing  various  kinds of finan-
cial assistance.
At the same time, the power of government reorganization  and
consolidation  is retained  at  the higher levels. Thus  a considerable
number  of local  governments  have  been  consolidated  into  larger
and presumably  more  rational  units.  And  this  has  contributed  to
more effective  planning.  The  Basic  Law even  anticipates  redraw-
ing of the boundaries of the several states. There is an acute aware-
ness  of  unevenness  in  development  and  prosperity  among  the
several  geographic  portions  of the  nation,  and  deliberate  policies
have  been formulated  to equalize  economic  well-being  geographi-
cally.  These  policies,  as  well  as  many  others  of national  scope,
must  be  considered  by  local  planning  authorities,  so  that  what
is  decided  at  the  local  level  must  be  consistent  with  state  and
national  objectives.  To  achieve  this,  local  plans  are  subject  to
review  by  higher authorities,  primarily the  state agencies.
Let  us  turn  now  to  some  of the  basic  policies  and techniques
which  rest  upon  the concept  of the  social  responsibility  of prop-
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and  conditions,  and  that  land  use  controls,  therefore,  seek  the
general  welfare  in  a  positive  sense  (in  contrast to  the  essentially
negative  view  of general  welfare  in  the  American  police  power
enactments).
First,  the  local  planning  units  are  required  to  plan  virtually
for the entire country under the guidelines of superior and supervis-
ing governments.  The planning  process  involves inputs from  pro-
fessional planners,  but opportunities for citizen inputs are also pro-
vided by means of hearings  and by provisions for legal challenges.
The basic technique is land classification under which land is desig-
nated  as  building  land,  agricultural  land,  forest  land,  industrial
land, etc.  Once a plan is adopted it has the force of law.  Variances
in classification  are  rare  occurrences.
For  example,  there  is  a  case  where  a farmer  (who  in  typical
fashion  lived  in  the  village  and  went  daily  to  his  land  to  farm)
was  housed  in  an  attic  apartment  where,  because  of the  size  of
his  family,  he  was  very  crowded.  Since  his  land  was  classified
as  "farm  land,"  he asked  that the plan  be changed  to  permit him
to build  an adequate  house  on his land.  He exhausted  all appeals,
including  a petition  to  the  state  legislature,  but  no  variance  was
granted.  Instead,  the  mayor of the  village  was  instructed  to  find
land  classified  as  "building  land"  and  to  work  out  a  trade  with
the farmer.
Another  technique  involves  the authority of the  planning  unit
to freeze all land uses for periods not exceeding four years.  Beyond
that time, landowners may be entitled to compensation.  Once such
a  freeze  is  imposed,  land  rights  may  be  transferred  but  the  land
must remain  in the  same use.
Related  to  this  authority  to  freeze  land  uses  is  the  authority
to  prevent  building  for  a  specific  period  of time,  or  where  it  is
inconsistent  with the approved plan.  As  the example cited  above
suggests,  the planning  authorities  usually  are  empowered  to  pur-
chase  land  to  implement  a  plan.  This  is  a  broad  power,  permit-
ting  purchase  of land  to  be traded  for another  parcel  in order to
recombine parcels for more  sensible urban development  or to con-
solidate holdings for better farm management.  An important  value
underlying  plan  development  is  landscape  protection-a  concern
for  visual  amenities.  Plans  are  multipurpose  in  scope,  seeking
to take into consideration  the whole range  of development  factors
that  will  influence  land  use.  This  is  the  ideal,  yet  coordination
with the  specialized  planning  activities for highways,  water,  etc.,
is  not always  easy,  the specialist's  view of the world  in  Germany
being  not unlike that of his American  counterpart.
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valuation of land required for public  purposes in accordance  with
particular plans. As indicated  above,  the German courts have  dis-
missed  "market  value"  as  a  viable  standard.  Moreoever,  value
is  measured  in  terms  of the  present  use  of the  land  and  not  in
terms of the owner's  expectations  with  respect  to  it.  Thus,  farm
land is valued as farm land in terms of its productivity,  even though
it  is  right  on  the  edge  of a  city  or  town.  And  its  character  as
farm  land  is  in turn  a function  of the  approved  plan.  Obviously,
this  removes  much of the speculative  element.  At the  same time,
if farm  land  is  reclassified  as  building  or  housing  land  in  a  new
or revised  plan,  the owner  will  be entitled to  the unearned  incre-
ment that  may  result.  One  other  aspect  of valuation  in  German
practice  is  further evidence  of the extent to which  value  is  recog-
nized  as a  function of societal  action.  If you  own  100 acres,  and
20 are  taken for public purposes  in  accordance  with the approved
plan, and the  value of the remaining 80 acres is as high as or higher
than  was  the  value  of the  100  under  the  existing  uses,  you  are
not entitled  to compensation.  Your  condition  has not been  wors-
ened  by  the change.
SUMMARY
To summarize this difference,  then,  in U.S.  Constitutional law
"taking"  of private  property  is  interpreted  as  a  general  term  to
cover  almost  anything  that  diminishes  or  negatively  affects  the
area or the value expectations of the owner. Similarly, "just price"
means market price and is applied to every  taking. And the market
used to measure  the price  is the market of expectations  as superfi-
cially  implied from the location of the property,  and not from the
needs of the community.  In the German  Basic Law, expropriation
does not apply to all actions which negatively affect  a tract. There
must be a "balancing"  of social and individual equities,  and value
is based on present use, not on expectations.  And  the courts have
specifically  disavowed  "market price,"  in part because  that  price
is socially  determined.
In  the United  States  it is  still prevailing  law  that  the property
owner  has  a  right  to  do  with  his  property  what  he  chooses;  he
can  use  it  in  any  way  he  sees  fit,  so  long  as  no  direct  nuisance
damage occurs to his neighbor.  While zoning,  subdivision controls,
and a number of other regulations have begun to alter this situation,
the American  courts  still tend strongly  to regard any public action
which diminishes the landowner's rights  as a "taking"  of property
requiring "just compensation,"  interpreted  as market  value based
on expectations.  Thus  William Whyte  and  others  have proposed,
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fee  or to  buy  a  variety  of scenic  and  other  easements  to  protect
the  public interest.
In  our  theories  we  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  the  value
of a tract  to  a  large  extent  is  determined  by  society  and  by  its
laws.  The transportation  system  which  takes  farm  production  to
market,  the economic  system  which  results  in urban  growth  and
establishes  the pressure  for  urban housing,  these  and many other
kinds of social actions  in fact determine  value and perhaps  should
be considered  in determining  a "just price."
In both American and German law there is little question about
the  responsibility  for nuisance  damages  to  property.  Nor is  there
any argument  about compensation for public actions  which dimin-
ish  the potential  for  existing  uses.  The  significant  difference  lies
in  the  way  the  questions  of changes  in  land  use  are  handled.  It
would  be useful  to  analyze  the  question of whether  the constitu-
tional requirement for "just compensation"  should include expec-
tations  (which  may not  be  realistic)  and unearned  increments.  In
short,  we  need  to  develop  some  concepts  of the  public  interest
in  private  land,  drawing  on bits  and  pieces  of public  interest  law
scattered  through  the  total  body  of our  law.  Until  we  develop
modernized  theories  of  property,  we  will  not  be  able  to  do  an
effective job of land use  planning  and control.
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